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JUST PRICES
Robert C. Hockett* & Roy Kreitner**
In what sense do market prices represent or convey value? At first
glance, such prices might look like the upshot of spontaneous social ag-
gregation without exogenously imposed order: uncoordinated individual
trading decisions yield "price information" that is said both to induce
socially efficient productive decisions and to set a framework that facili-
tates coherent and welfare-enhancing consumer choice. But while some
trading decisions might well be uncoordinated, far from all of them are;
and the rules within which trade is conducted are in any event the prod-
uct of social choice. When we recognize that these rules of trade and
certain public practices of trade affect the terms of trade, we cannot but
ask whether the rules, the relevant practices, and the prices they partly
produce can underwrite just social arrangements. The shorthand rendi-
tion of this question is when are market prices just? In this paper we set
out to untangle some of the economic and philosophic issues implicated
by this loaded question, and to propose a set of considerations that can
aid evaluation of the justice (or otherwise) of market prices.
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INTRODUCTION
It is distinctly unfashionable to talk of just prices. The very term
seems to betray a lack of sophistication, an appeal to a fruitless query
abandoned ages ago. Nonetheless, we believe there is significant insight
to be gleaned by reawakening the question of the relationship between
* Edward Cornell Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; and Professor of Public Af-
fairs, Cornell University.
** Professor of Law, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University.
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justice and market prices. The reason for this is that "the price system" is
a crucial part of the infrastructure of our social relations, while relative
prices themselves are reflective of those relations. The entire gamut of
market transactions is undergirded by the system of prices, ranging from
the least significant purchases of trifles all the way through financial
deals routinely measured in the millions and billions of currency units.
The system enjoys the veneer of purely voluntary interaction, pursued
with no organizing intelligence. Phenomenologically, we often gaze
upon prices as upon brute facts. Set in distant, disorganized, and seem-
ingly unfathomable processes of aggregation, they appear to inhere in
market goods, products, services, or financial assets the way weight in-
heres in a stone, or smoothness in a pebble. Ultimately, however, the
price system is an immense engineering project. As much as it shapes
our action by marking relative values, it is shaped by our action in
promulgating and administering the rules of its operation. And because
its operations both reflect and determine so many of the relationships that
course through the modern economy, its humanly created rules should
bear the scrutiny of sustained reflection.
At the outset, we should probably clear aside one potential misun-
derstanding that would cloud the inquiry we intend to pursue. In pursuing
the question of just prices, we have no intention of raising any claims
related to the putatively intrinsic worth of particular goods or classes of
goods. There will be no attempt to determine the ideal relationship, say,
of the price of a good and the cost of its production, or of the intrinsic
value of a particular type of labor. Instead, we will be interested prima-
rily in the structural features of any established system of prices. We will
show that while the system may have certain consistent features, it actu-
ally works in different ways in different settings. That plurality will be
one of the keys to generating a better account of the possible interactions
between justice and prices.
The Article proceeds in four steps. Part I specifies a few leading
economic and philosophic arguments regarding the relationship between
prices and justice that have been offered since the marginalist revolution
in economics. Those arguments begin with a confident claim that prices
under competition represent a just distribution of the rewards of produc-
tion and a full-bodied retort to charges that labor is exploited under con-
ditions of capitalist enterprise. Through the twentieth century and into
our own day, those claims have beat a nuanced retreat. However, they
maintain a rhetorical framework in which market prices typically con-
verge with just relations, while pathologies are viewed as exceptional.
Part II challenges the most attractive version of this line of argu-
ment. It proceeds by pointing out three qualitatively different problems
with the ideal associated with market prices: first, the fact that prices
JUST PRICES
should not be conceived as arising spontaneously; second, that back-
ground conditions often beget prices that undercut the goal of the price
system narrowly conceived, which rests on individual choice; and third,
that market prices (especially in systemically important areas such as fi-
nancial assets) are often beset by collective action problems - some fa-
miliar, others not - that undermine and in some cases foreclose the
system's ability to achieve its allocative goals.
Part III develops some general insights regarding the question of
how establishing and administering a price system can answer to consid-
erations of justice. It generalizes the critique of spontaneity, making clear
that the rhetorical frame implied by the standard account should be up-
ended, indeed reversed. In other words, the quietist attitude toward prices
actually existing in most markets should be abandoned in favor of a criti-
cal cast of mind, attentive to the fact that most prices are already engi-
neered. It then begins to develop the vocabulary for a line of thinking and
associated vision that would take responsibility for prices as we make
them. Part IV takes the general insights to specific contexts where the
advantages of a more forthright acknowledgment of responsibility for
prices is especially promising.
I. THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND, OR THE CASE FOR PRICES
We begin our account of the intellectual background for our argu-
ment at the close of the nineteenth century, with the advent of marginal-
ist economics.' Against the backdrop of claims (both from within the
scientific community and, perhaps more trenchantly, from reformers and
popular writers) that labor is systematically exploited in capitalist econo-
mies, the leading marginalist economist in the United States formulated a
confident answer. In The Distribution of Wealth, 2 John Bates Clark met
such claims head on, asserting that competitive markets yielded the
agents of production their fair shares of the gains generated by produc-
tion. Clark held that a natural law divided the income of society into
wages, which are the earnings of labor; interest, the earnings of capital;
and profits, the earnings of the entrepreneur (or coordinator of efficient
1 The doctrine of just price has a much longer pedigree, of course. We forgo discussion
of it here because neither the Aristotelian roots, the development by Aquinas, nor the ensuing
discussions of the doctrine speak to the general question of the nature of the price system -
they are all concerned with just price in a particular transaction, against a particular back-
ground. For more on those questions, see Robert Hockett, What Ever Happened to Just
Prices?, LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY, January 10, 2018, available at https://lpeblog.org/2018/
01/10/whatever-happened-to-just-prices/.
2 JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTEREST
AND PROFITS (1899). Clark had been publishing the ideas encapsulated in the book as early as
1881. On Clark's status as "the master of American marginalism," see JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 868-70 (1954).
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relations among the agents of production). Despite minor variances trace-
able to local strengths and weaknesses in bargaining, transactions would
converge around market rates governed by a natural law. Crucially,
"where natural laws have their way, the share of income that attaches to
any productive function is gauged by the actual product of it. In other
words, free competition tends to give to labor what labor creates, to capi-
talists what capital creates, and to entrepreneurs what the coordinating
function creates. ' '3
Clark's analysis was based on the idea that the contribution of each
function to production was distinguishable, and the further claim that the
reward corresponded precisely to the contribution. The background ideal
of justice that undergirds Clark's analysis is "to each what he creates,"
and the book is devoted to proving that the principle in fact accords with
the workings of competitive markets. Clark was clear and insistent that
the analysis was meant as a refutation of the charge that a competitive
labor market leads to exploitation:
The indictment that hangs over society is that of "ex-
ploiting labor." "Workmen" it is said, "are regularly
robbed of what they produce. This is done within the
forms of law, and by the natural working of competi-
tion." If this charge were proved, every right-minded
man should become a socialist; and his zeal in trans-
forming the industrial system would then measure and
express his sense of justice.4
Happily for Clark, the upshot of his analysis would be that the charge is
false. Wages, interest, and profits are in fact "fixed according to a sound
principle, [and] the different classes of men who combine their forces in
industry have no grievances against each other."'5 Clark admitted that
"friction" could distort the proper apportionment between wages and
profit, but his theoretical conclusion remained that "wages tend to equal
the product of marginal labor." Competition guarantees that each agent
receives precisely that share of increased wealth he has contributed to the
total product, "that is, the amount that the marginal workers produce."
6
Clark's argument might seem compelling at first blush. Surely fac-
tor prices reached under competitive conditions are traceable in some
sense to comparative social valuations, and hence are well "on the way"
to social justice, as it were, if not yet quite just. In anticipation of our
3 CLARK, supra note 22, at 3 (italics in original).
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 7-8. The quoted passage is couched in a question that opens the investigation,
but its proof is Clark's stated goal, and his conclusion is that the natural law exists and is
effective, though subject to frictions that may lead to local distortions.
6 Id. at 106-07.
JUST PRICES
arguments below, however, we should note a crucial "missing person" in
connection with Clark's catalogue of factors of production-a person
who bears critically upon that "under competitive conditions" qualifier.
We mean the rentier.
People passingly familiar with the tripartite division of productive
factors found in early treatises on political economy-land, labor, and
capital-might, if insufficiently attentive, suppose that Clark is reproduc-
ing that taxonomy. In fact, however, Clark has dropped land altogether
from account, and has subdivided the earlier category of "capital" into
separate funding and organizing roles assumed, it seems, to be accessible
to all. This is crucial for our purposes because, if central elements of a
society's productive capacity, including land and lendable funds,7 are
held monopolistically or oligopolistically, then not-yet-justified dispari-
ties in price-making power among market participants will not be mere
"bugs" or anomalies in existing price systems; they will be "features,"
fully as inherent to those systems as the property arrangements that they
presuppose. And this will undermine not only the equating of "marginal
product" to "just deserts," but even the coherence of any putatively dis-
tribution-independent notion of "product" itself.8
Intriguingly, some marginalists noticed what Clark overlooked. One
of the founders both of the marginalist tradition and of the linking of
marginalism to justice inquiry in particular, Lon Walras, was a commit-
ted social reformer and follower of Henry George, among other "redis-
tributionists" (including his father, Auguste Walras).9 He was explicit
7 Not to mention, arguably, certain forms of entrepreneurial know-how.
8 We allude here to the notorious "Cambridge Capital Controversies" of the 1960s,
which Paul Samuelson famously conceded to have been "won" by the English, as distin-
guished from the American (Massachussetts), Cambridge economists. The "English" Cam-
bridgians showed, in essence, that there is no coherent conception of "social product," to
which "productive factors" might marginally contribute and hence in relation to which those
factors' appropriate rewards might be determined, that is independent of the antecedent distri-
bution of factor endowments themselves-endowments protected and vindicated, or course, by
property and contract law.
The dispute prefigures, on an adjacent terrain, that which subsequently broke out between
Richard Posner on the one hand, Jules Coleman and Ronald Dworkin on the other hand, over
whether Kaldor-Hicksian "efficiency" could serve as a normative yardstick in deciding upon a
socially optimal distribution of entitlements. Intriguingly, here too the "U.S." side in the dis-
pute-in this case, Posner-ultimately conceded that it had got things wrong, and on grounds
not unlike those that had proved the "American Cambridgians"' undoing earlier: the "wealth"
in relation to which optimal distribution was to be evaluated was, like the "product" at issue in
the "Cambridge Controversies," itself always the product of antecedent distribution.
For a thorough overview of the "Cambridge Capital Controversies," see G.C. HARCOURT,
SOME CAMBRIDGE CONTROVERsIEs IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1972). For similar treatment
of the Coleman/Dworkin/Posner dispute of the 1980s, see Robert Hockett, The Libertarian
Welfare State, 56 CHALLENGE 100 (2013); Hockett, sources cited infra, notes 19 and 26.
9 See, e.g., LtoN WALRAS, ETUDES D'tCONOME SocIALE; THtORIE DE LA RtPARTITION
DE LA RIcHESSE SOCIALE 25-30 (1896) ("TUDES"); see also LtON WALRAS, L'tCONOMIE
2018]
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that no system of prices reached under conditions of monopoly or oligop-
oly could be just, and consistently inveighed against fellow economists
for ignoring that fact.10 This is why he argued throughout his days that
states should both nationalize land rents-if not land and other natural
resources themselves-and put in place legal regimes facilitating the for-
mation of labor and credit cooperatives.11 Only this way, he argued,
could monopoly rents on land and capital, and monopsony rents on em-
ployment, be neutralized and a just spread of price-making opportunity
over a population be realized. 12 Such reforms also offered means of ena-
bling laborers themselves to become, in Walras' words, capitalists-peo-
ple who could "borrow from themselves" rather than from others and
thereby avoid being effectively "enslaved." 13 We'll return to this more
egalitarian marginalist "road not taken" below.
Marginalism, of course, has remained the backbone of modem eco-
nomics, and thus many of Clark's insights have held up over the years.
His sweeping endorsement of the justice of existing distributions of the
proceeds of production, however, did not fare as well. Bracketing, for
now, frontal critiques of the kind just referenced in connection with
Walras, it is noteworthy that most modem champions of market econo-
mies beat a nuanced but strategic retreat on the question of just prices.
Perhaps the most insistent voice on the issue belonged to Friedrich
Hayek. Hayek believed that the market order was better than any other
system for organizing society. At the same time, he adamantly claimed
that it was a category mistake to attempt to assess the justice or injustice
of a market order. To the question of whether the concept of social jus-
tice has any content, Hayek answered with a firm no. He claimed that in
"a system in which each is allowed to use his own knowledge for his
own purposes, the concept of 'social justice' is necessarily empty and
meaningless, because in it nobody's will can determine the relative in-
comes of the different people, or prevent that they be partly dependent on
accident." 14
POLITIQUE ET LA JUSTICE (1860). A compendium of Auguste Walras' views can be found in
AUGUSTE WALRAS, THEORIE DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE (1849).
10 See, e.g., WALRAS, ETUDES, id., at 42-49.
11 Id. at 144-46, 267. See also Ldon Walras, Theorie Mathematique du Prix des Terres,
in LON WALRAs, THORIE MATHtMATIQUE DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE (1883); and LtON
WALRAS, LES ASSOCIATIONS POPULAIRES DE CONSOMMATION, DE PRODUCTION ET DE CRtD1T
(1865) ("LEs ASSOCIATIONS POPULAIRES"). The socialization of land and natural resources is
among the earliest and most consistently advocated of Walras's policy proposals throughout
his life. See also, e.g., LtON WALRAS, THIoRIE CRITIQUE DE L'IMPOT (1861); and LtON
WALRAS, DE L'IMPOT DANS LE CANTON DE VAUD (1861).
12 WALRAS, LES ASSOCIATIONS POPULAIRES, at 20.
13 Id. at 61. See also WALRAS, ETuDEs, supra note 9, at 144-45
14 2 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 69
(1982).
JUST PRICES
So, where Clark's claim was that the distribution of income in a
market order was just, Hayek's is that it cannot be just or unjust:
We are of course not wrong in perceiving that the
effects of the processes of a free society on the fates of
the different individuals are not distributed according to
some recognizable principle of justice. Where we go
wrong is in concluding from this that they are unjust and
that somebody is to be blamed for this. In a free society
in which the position of the different individuals and
groups is not the result of anybody's design-or could,
within such a society, be altered in accordance with a
generally applicable principle-the differences in reward
simply cannot meaningfully be described as just or
unjust. 15
Thus, while Hayek believed that remuneration would tend to bring about
a correspondence between the remuneration for a service and the value
of the service to those who receive them, he acknowledged that "these
values which their services will have to their fellows will often have no
relations to their individual merits or needs." 16 Hayek recognized but
lamented the fact that popular defenses of market systems relied, unjusti-
fiably, on the "ground that it regularly rewards the deserving, and it
bodes ill for the future of the market order that this seems to have be-
come the only defence [sic] of it which is understood by the general
public." 17 For Hayek, the defense of the market order rests not on the
justice of the resulting distribution, but rather on the system's capacity to
improve welfare:
[W]e use an impersonal process to determine the alloca-
tion of benefits precisely because through its operation
we can bring about a structure of relative prices and re-
munerations that will determine a size and composition
15 Id. at 69-70. The passage continues by explaining the requirements for justice:
[Jiustice is an attribute of human conduct... Justice requires that in the 'treatment'
of another person or persons, i.e. in the intentional actions affecting the well-being of
other persons, certain uniform rules of conduct be observed. It clearly has no appli-
cation to the manner in which the impersonal process of the market allocates com-
mand over goods and services to particular people: this can be neither just nor
unjust, because the results are not intended or foreseen, and depend on a multitude of
circumstances not known in their totality to anybody. Id.
Notably missing from this rough-and-ready account of justice is any distinction between
human conduct that is pursued individually for personal benefit on the one hand, and collec-
tively for public benefit on the other. Likewise missing is any sensitivity, where intentions are
concerned, to the distinction between "intended" and "tolerated" results, or any defense of the
suggestion that no unjust upshots of defective arrangements can be "foreseen."
16 Id. at 72 (italics in original).
17 Id. at 74.
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of the total output which assures that the real equivalent
of each individual's share that accident or skill assigns to
him will be as large as we know [how] to make it.18
Hayek's defense of markets withdraws from the direct claim of jus-
tice, but maintains the general appeal of a market order by reference to a
principle of wealth-maximizing allocative efficiency as distinguished
from distributive justice. It is noteworthy for purposes of the discussion
below that Hayek says nothing about (a) why he assumes that we cannot
rectify, collectively, at least some defects in the distribution of what he
calls "accidents" that are "not the result of any individual's design" (em-
phasis added); or (b) why he considers social wealth aggregates deriving
from allocative efficiency normatively interesting, given his objection to
principled redistribution of such aggregates. 19 We shall return to this ob-
servation in the next Section.
Recently, Daniel Markovits has articulated a theory of market soli-
darity that brackets the matter of allocative efficiency, while reasserting
the attractiveness of the price system on a different basis. According to
Markovits, market interactions establish prices "as a commensurating
frame" through which market actors manage or sidestep value disagree-
ments. 20 Prices in competitive markets allow for all goods to be mea-
sured on a common scale of value (thus the term, "price
commensuration"), without anyone's having to merge their competing
value systems. Participants in markets not only assign different values to
things, they also have different reasons for valuing things in the first
place. But markets with money prices allow for a shared frame of value
in which no one must agree or subordinate herself to with anyone else
where values or reasons for valuations are concerned: "competitive
prices arise among traders acting as price-takers. None chooses prices-
they just happen, and in the same way, to all traders."'' l
Markovits views this putative price-making feature of markets as "a
moral achievement in its own right," for interrelated reasons, two of
18 Id. at 72. For Hayek's initial formulation of the idea that the price system generates
signals leading to efficient behavior and thus tending toward optimal output, see generally
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REv. 519 (1945).
19 On the ethical indifference of aggregates considered apart from the justice of their
distribution, see, Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory of Jus-
tice, 26 CARIozo L. REv. 3 (2005) (hereinafter "Deep Grammar"); Robert Hockett, Whose
Ownership? Which Society?, 27 C&Aozo L. REv. 1 (2005) (hereinafter "Whose Ownership");
Robert Hockett, Putting Distribution First, 18 THnoRETiCA INQURIs IN LAW 159 (2017)
(hereinafter "Distribution First").
20 Daniel Markovits, Guido Calabresi Professorship, Inaugural Address at Yale Univer-
sity: Market Solidarity (Apr. 9, 2012).
21 Id. at 10
JUST PRICES
which are important here.22 First, "the internal normative structure of
price commensuration" or the "internal logic" of markets fixes prices
according to the decentralized and uncoordinated expressions of prefer-
ence of every market participant. All participants are price-takers, and
thus all are formally equal: "Price commensuration implements an im-
portant conception of the formal equality of persons, a conception of
equality of status, really. '23 Second, the price system is a "free-standing
value frame" that is shared, public, non-discursive, and foundationless.
Participation in the price system, according to Markovits, requires no
agreement on base values. People with competing or even warring values
can interact on the basis of prices, without having to engage their oppos-
ing perspectives.
Furthermore, and crucially for our purposes here, Markovits makes
the provocative claim that market contracting based on formal equality,
"can authorize arrangements that involve substantive inequality." Thus,
Contracts obligate even where made against unjust back-
grounds, including even when (because the party that
can do better without the bargain does better within it)
they allow one side to leverage underserved bargaining
advantages in a way that entrenches injustice. Contract
obligation does not depend on setting the world right
before contracts are made or require improving the
world through contracting. Contract possesses the power
to launder injustice, creating legitimate entitlements be-
tween parties where previously none existed.24
Markovits's argument thus seems more ambitious than one based on
allocation. Price commensuration is the creation of a frame of interaction
where value is at once shared, public, objectively identifiable, and at the
same time bracketed in respect of its content. Prices are settled without
discussion, and within the price system people are free to pursue any
ends they can imagine for any reasons, without having to convince one
another of the desirability or even the legitimacy of those ends. This
system entails a formal equality and an associated "horizontal solidarity"
22 Markovits spends a brief paragraph on the efficiency of competitive equilibrium pric-
ing as one reason to support them. We won't elaborate on that paragraph here.
23 Id. at 11. Markovits goes on to distinguish this type of equality from substantive
equality, which is not secured by markets. "The failure of substantive equality does not undo
the price-commensuration's formal equality, however, or undermine its moral value." That is
of course true enough, but we feel some reticence about celebrating our long-since-established
formal equality while our substantive inequality is (a) what has exercised social critics most
over the past two centuries and (b) is now steadily worsening. The point is not lost on Marko-
vits, who treats the subject innovatively and in depth in DANIEL MAKovrrs, SNOWBALL I',m-
QuAITY: MERrOcRAcY AND THE CRI Is OF CAPITALISM (forthcoming 2018).
24 Id. at 19.
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that serves as an independent recommendation for its adoption, and as an
argument for a wide scope for freedom of contract.25
Once more in anticipation of our discussion below, it bears noting
here both what Markovits prescinds from and what he appears to take
for granted. First note what is unique about Markovits's claim. The ob-
servation that, at least under certain carefully specified conditions, a sys-
tem of prices can operate both as a mode of commensuration that renders
liberal justice practicable and as an ethically plausible measure of ethi-
cally interesting comparative social valuations of disparate goods and
circumstances is not what is novel or new. One of us has made this point
repeatedly, in these very terms, over the past 15 years-both in address-
ing what Richard Arneson long ago identified as an "index problem"
afflicting certain liberal accounts of justice, and in elaborating an ethi-
cally plausible ideal against which to evaluate the successes and failures
of our efforts at market-improving legal and institutional optimization
over time.26 What is distinctive in Markovits' discussion is the sugges-
tion, for seemingly the first time since the 19th century, that the formal
equality implicit in the institution of contract and its price-generating
properties can serve actually to "launder," rather than simply disguise or
obscure, substantive injustice-and that therefore, by implication, the
formal "freedom" entailed by "freedom of contract" affords us some-
thing to celebrate even in a world in which most actual contracting is
substantively and not-yet-justifiedly coercive. What this account
prescinds from is precisely those substantive matters, which have consti-
tuted the main line of market critique for at least two centuries.2 7 What
the account takes for granted, in turn, is a world in which market partici-
pants-even labor and capital market participants-"act as price-takers,"
and that prices accordingly "just happen" in those markets. These as-
sumptions are heroic in a world of rentiers such as that in which Walras
25 Id. at 12-13. In explaining why market societies trade and price housing, medical care,
education, Markovits continues: "This is ... a self-conscious commitment, commonly ex-
pressed through the familiar ideal of freedom of contract. That ideal affirms the broad scope of
markets as a matter of principle, often grounded in anti-patemalist ideas about individual sov-
ereignty that are close cousins to the conception of formal equality of status at the root price-
commensuration."
26 See Hockett, Deep Grammer, supra note 19 at 1221-33; Hockett, Whose Ownership?,
supra, note 19 at 42-48; Hockett, Distribution First, supra note 19, at 211-220. Robert Hock-
ett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice, 36 METAPHIMOSOPHY 93,
95-105 (2005); Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited (Comell Law
Faculty Publications, working paper 55, 89-97 2003), http://scholarship.law.comell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgiarticle= 1054&context=lsrp-papers.
27 See, e.g., works of the elder and younger Walras cited supra, notes 9 and 11. There is
some irony, in this connection, to be found in the fact that the word "launder" when used in
connection with money generally suggests something is being deliberately hidden.
JUST PRICES
saw us to be living.28 They are yet more heroic in such a world that is
transparently of our own making and potential improving, as we elabo-
rate more fully below.
There are of course additional modem accounts of the relationship
between justice and prices. These three have been chosen because they
represent sophisticated yet uncompromising accounts, providing analyti-
cal clarity.29 Their differences are significant, but their similarities
should not be ignored. Two features are especially important for our
purposes.
First, for each of these theories, the key feature that lends the price
system its normative attraction is its status as the decentralized and unor-
ganized result of competitive transactional behavior. Prices act as infor-
mational signals according to which individuals make decisions that
require no prior centralized coordination. The charm of the price system
is that everyone confronts it in formally equal terms, where no individual
directly coerces anyone else. The system is unplanned, and thus requires
no collective decisionmaking. The difficulties attendant upon group
agreement over which resources or services are how valuable-the inher-
ently divisive processes of politics-are imagined as external to the price
system.
Second, each of these theories relies on a rhetorical frame that treats
competitive, decentralized markets as the norm. Departures from compe-
tition are acknowledged, and all three theories see such departures as
potential obstacles to achieving the attractive qualities of markets. Each
of them admits that actual markets are not perfectly competitive, but each
builds on the assumption that existing markets approximate competitive
conditions, and that departures can be treated as anomalous.
28 See again works of Walras cited supra, notes 9 and 11. Markovits acknowledges that
"the monopolist stands in a qualitatively distinct relation to the price system." Markovits,
supra note 20, at 12 (italics removed). "But the difference between the relations to prices of
the rich and the poor is not qualitative but merely quantitative and hence does not undermine
price-commensuration or market-solidarity." Id. It is not clear to us what work the putative
contrast between "qualitative" and "quantitative" distinctions is doing in this passage; nor,
relatedly, is it clear why vast disparities in the price-influencing powers of the rich and the
poor would "not undermine price-commensuration or market-solidarity." The very wealthy
enjoy much greater price-determining powers than do the very poor, which powers simply
reach their limiting points in the cases of monopoly or monopsony. When one reflects further
that the very poor historically have been very poor precisely because the very rich have been
rentiers with legally sanctioned monopoly or oligopoly power over land and capital and corre-
sponding monopsony or oligopsony power over labor markets, the attempt to place the rich/
poor relation on a qualitatively different (and more solidarity-consistent) footing than that of
the monopolist/nonmonopolist relation looks more mysterious still.
29 For an example of a sophisticated but compromising (or fusionist) account that is still
highly favorable toward the justice of market pricing, see generally JoHN TOMASI, FREE MAR-
KET FAIRNEss (2012). Arneson's discussion of the "index problem" is in Richard Arneson,
Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 Noes 429 (1990).
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II. THE PARTIALITY OF PRICES
Many of the advantages of (at least some renditions of) the price
system and its attendant market ordering are well understood and real.
But the conditions under which those advantages pertain are far from
general, while departures from those conditions are anything but idiosyn-
cratic. In this part, we outline three kinds of challenges that confront
defenses of the price system. We begin by discussing the extent to which
prices arise free from collective determinations of value. We then move
on to note difficulties that arise from the background conditions under
which people enter markets, and in particular the problems that arise
when severe departures from endowment neutrality are built into certain
markets. Finally, we discuss certain endogenous market dynamics that
distort pricing in structurally important cases.
A. Prices and Collective Decisionmaking
Defenses of the price system rely heavily both on an ideal of decen-
tralization and on an associated form of equality among market partici-
pants, according to which values are not decided upon through exercises
of either market power or collective deliberation, but rather arise as the
products of endless series of unrelated instances of exchange among
equals. In Markovits's phrasing, "competitive prices arise among traders
acting as price-takers. None chooses prices-they just happen, and in the
same way, to all traders."' 30 And this is precisely the ideal that grounds
Hayek's vision of a spontaneous order.31 The most fundamental problem
with this ideal is that it does not hold water even analytically, let alone
empirically. True, market prices appear to arise spontaneously from ex-
changes in antecedently given markets, but the background rules that de-
termine the shape of exchange are anything but spontaneous. Prices do
not "just happen" in a completely decentralized and uncoordinated man-
ner. Markets have to be made, infrastructures supplied, units of account
determined and managed, rules established as to what counts as property
and what kinds of property are alienable, saleable, and taxable. The rules
of property and contract law themselves shape both the contours and the
values of entitlements.
Market creation and market maintenance are the products not of
spontaneous genesis, but of institutional design, legislative action, and
judicial decision. Even more importantly, they do not set an immutable
baseline leaving disorganized parties to play a game of price with eter-
30 Markovits, supra note 20, at 10. See also Hayek, supra note18, at 525-27.
31 See 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54
(1982); HAYEK, supra note 14, at 107-20.
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nally fixed rules.32 Instead, collective, organizational decisions play a
central role in manufacturing and moving prices. 33 Examples of the im-
pact of public decisions on the price system range from the obvious to
the more subtle, but most are straightforward enough to mention here
without detailed elaboration. On the obvious side, public employment
and procurement effectively benchmark prices for some of the most im-
portant goods and services in the putatively privately ordered economy. 34
Similarly, changing background rules make all the difference in pricing
many of the most important market interactions. It is hard to imagine
pricing pharmaceuticals without patent law; impossible to make sense of
real estate prices without local zoning ordinances; incoherent to consider
the price of medical care without insurance law. 35
Less obviously yet more pervasively, the price system cannot actu-
ally circumvent inherently contestable valuation, because money itself is
disseminated and managed via centralized decisions that directly affect
prices. 36 Just to note a notorious example from recent years: banking
regulation determines the costs of credit in different sectors of the econ-
omy and thus affects prices, but not equally. Asset prices in financial
markets are crucially dependent on decisions by central banks regarding
what to accept as collateral on loans. 37 And when central banks-as
agents of the public, or the collective-make their decisions, they move
both the price of credit and the prices of major financial assets. 38 The
heart of any price system is its unit of account, and public decisions-be
they monetary decisions concerning credit and interest or fiscal decisions
concerning what and how much to tax as well as on what and how much
to spend-are collectively organized determinants of the value of the
32 For detailed elaboration, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and
Contract Efficient? 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
33 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public" Ends:
Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 53 (2014).
34 The entire arms industry is "priced" by what government decides to pay; there is no
market for armored personnel carriers or missiles outside government procurement. Less obvi-
ous but often just as important, salaries for engineers and other professionals will be extremely
sensitive to decisions on military spending. The same is true a step down in the pay scale, for
example with the "market" for teaching overwhelmingly dominated by government.
35 The list could go on for a very long time, including energy markets, transportation,
and hosts of others.
36 Christine Desan, The Monetary Structure of Economic Activity, forthcoming in INSiDE
MoNEY (Christine Desan ed., 2018); Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY
IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 18, 20-24 (David Fox & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2016)
(describing the development of money as a legal institution). For a comprehensive tracing of
public money-dissemination throughout the entirety of the modern financial system, see Rob-
ert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143
(2017).
37 See PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: How THE FED BECAME THE
DEALER OF LAST RESORT 48-51, 62-63 (2010).
38 Hockett & Omarova, supra notes 33 and 36.
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unit, i.e., the state's money. 39 In short, the price system is deliberately
engineered rather than spontaneously generated.
B. The Impact of Background (In)Equality
We have seen that one key to the attraction of a system of market
prices is that it can instantiate a species of formal equality, or what Mar-
kovits aptly terms equality of [juridical] status.40 In celebrating that form
of equality, we have noted, Markovits further suggests that the very pro-
cess of market contracting has the power to "launder injustice.' 41 But
while some market situations might legitimately yield this rather thin
form of solidarity, it seems that under many realistic conditions the stain
of injustice will be too deep to be laundered. There are two faces of this
problem worth mentioning. The first has to do with prices, particularly
prices for labor, when background conditions leave parties especially
vulnerable. The most obviously salient background condition in this case
is that in which one party is essentially property-less. "A person who
lives at the mercy of others' provision is vulnerable to exploitation and
abuse at their hands, and liable to humiliating forms of subjection. With-
out property, individuals are unable to defend their rights or advance
their claims on others in ways that command respectful attention...,42
This vulnerability has occupied the attention of concerned observers of
market societies from the time of the Greek municipal and Roman repub-
lics, to the present day.43
Another way of stating this concern is that at times, market con-
tracting is part of a system that entrenches what might be called substan-
tive, as distinguished from juridical status, rather than instantiating any
ethically salient form of equality. This is likely the situation for much of
the contracted labor in the developing world-not to mention, after de-
cades of legally-aided erosion of organized labor influence, for the devel-
oped world once again. But while this situation poses a serious practical
39 The analytical critique is generally applicable, but as we discuss below it has different
levels of bite in different market settings. Its effects are particularly visible at moments of
sharp legal change (e.g., extending the duration of copyright, or establishing a right to collec-
tive bargaining, or recognizing responsibility of manufacturers for products liability, or shift-
ing to quantitative easing). The important point (again, elaborated on below) is that there are
many important settings in which collective determinations have salient impacts on prices.
40 Markovits, supra note 20, at 11.
41 Id. at 4, 19.
42 Elizabeth Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks? 9 THEORETI-
CAL INQ. L. 239, 265-66 (2007).
43 For discussion of the history of, as well as defense of, this set of concerns, see, e.g.,
Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 19; Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 45 (2005). For recent book-length engagement with
the same concerns, see generally PHI=W PETrrT, JUST FREEDOM (2014); AXEL HoNNETH, FREE-
DOM'S RIGHT: THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC LIFE (2015); ROBERT HocKETT, A
REPUBLIC OF OWNERS (forthcoming 2018).
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problem (perhaps the most serious problem for a conception of global
distributive justice), it may not be theoretically daunting on its own. De-
fenders of market pricing can, and sometimes do, condition the legiti-
macy, or at least the desirability, of such pricing on collective bargaining
rights for labor, public employer of last resort programs, or guaranteed
basic minimum for all citizens.44 In this sense, most would agree that
prices that expose people to exploitation, to a lack of independence, or to
serious deterioration in what, following Rawls, we might call "the social
bases of self-respect," 45 are unjust or at least problematic and require
redress. The issue raises thorny boundary questions about what kinds of
products or services should enter the market at all,4 6 and raises equally
difficult questions about the proper comparison points for contracting
against facially exploitative backgrounds. 47
44 On collective bargaining, see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. On the em-
ployer of last resort idea, see, e.g., Robert Hockett, Open Labor Market Operations (working
paper, 2013) and Hockett & Omarova, supra note 33; see also, earlier and canonically, H.P.
Minsky, The Role of Employment Policy, in POVERTY IN AMERICA 175 (M.S. Gordon ed.,
1965); L. RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MODERN MONEY (1998); and sources cited infra,
note 6868. On the basic income idea, Anderson notes that even Hayek advocated providing
such minimum guarantee. Anderson, supra note 34, at 258. So, of course, did Milton Friedman
through his "negative income tax" proposals of the 1960s. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrAL-
ISM AND FREEDOM 191-94 (1961).
45 JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 178-87, 315-24 (1993); see also Hockett &
Risse, supra note 2626.
46 Obvious examples include the sale of bodily organs, where an intuitive argument is
that only someone with "no options" would enter such a contract. See generally, MARGARET
JANE RADN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (arguing that the tension between freedom of
choice and protection of integrity in contested commodification markets is the result of social
and economic inequalities); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY 125-26 (2012).
47 For a somewhat grotesque illustration, consider the case of a suit involving child labor
in Liberia, and Judge Posner's expression of what he saw as a difficulty for recognizing a
claim:
We also-and this is the biggest objection to this lawsuit-don't know the situation
of Liberian children who don't live on the Firestone plantation. Conceivably, be-
cause the fathers of the children on the plantation are well paid by Liberian stan-
dards, even the children who help their fathers with the work are, on balance, better
off than the average Liberian child, and would be worse off if their fathers, unable to
fill their daily quotas, lost their jobs or had to pay adult helpers, thus reducing the
family's income. There is a tradeoff between family income and child labor; children
are helped by the former and hurt by the latter; we don't know the net effect on their
welfare of working on the plantation.
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber, 643 F.3d 1013, 1024 (7th Cir. 2011). This seems to imagine
that the question of comparative welfare (i.e., with the market contract against the background
conditions, or without the contract against the same background) is decisive. While this may
be a plausible way to pursue an 'all things considered' distributive justice calculus, it seems
seriously deficient as a way to think about the justice of a particular employment relationship.
Considering the social bases of self-respect would quite obviously lead the analysis in a differ-
ent direction. For a related point on the distinction between distributive justice and justice of
relations, see Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Interpersonal Human Rights and Transna-
tional Private Law (Oct. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssm
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2860275).
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The second face of the problem of status and equality presents a
deeper conceptual challenge. Where exchange occurs in exploitative or
degrading conditions, as mentioned, most market advocates favor at least
some form redress. Indeed, many would point to such exchanges as dis-
tortions of properly functioning markets. But how far does the contami-
nation of such exchanges run? As observed in note 47, some market
advocates might believe that children are better off working on rubber
plantations than their next best alternative. But at some point, almost all
would agree that under some conditions there are some exchanges that
simply cannot be condoned. That is the backdrop for the challenging
question: once those offending exchanges have been carried out and their
products have entered the stream of commerce, how does the tainted ex-
change affect the potential justice of the prices in ensuing markets? To
return to the illustrative case, does it undermine the legitimacy of the
price of automobile tires produced by Firestone? Does it undermine the
legitimacy of the price of Firestone stock?48 The Firestone case is per-
haps extreme, especially as the charge there was not simply an exploita-
tive contract, but a reliance on child labor. But contracts that raise serious
questions of degrading the social bases of self-respect are not rare. The
fact that people would rather work in sweatshops than remain without
employment, particularly in a world long since "enclosed" where produc-
tive property ownership is concerned, would seem to afford insufficient
reason to rest quiet in the assurance that the work is not degrading. And
importantly, such labor contracts are imbricated through the chain of
commodities into most consumer markets in the developed world.
The two phases of the problem of background inequality just high-
lighted are interrelated. If the first phase of the problem, degrading ex-
changes, were extinguished, the second phase would disappear. But long
supply chains in globalized production processes raise the specter that
degrading exchange touches, however indirectly, vast swathes of market
activity. As a matter of intuition, the farther one is from degrading ex-
changes themselves, the less urgent any concern over the justice of the
price system in which one is buying and selling might seem; the taint
will at some point, perceptually speaking, attenuate. But this is akin to
believing infections to be benign because microbes are microscopic. That
one does not see the slaves weaving one's clothes does not mean the
slaves are not there; nor, by extension, does it mean that one's cheap
textiles are justly priced. This threat to the integrity of the price system
thus remains a significant challenge for the price system's champions
48 For those who are offended by the implication that Firestone is exploitative, all that is
necessary is to take an example extreme enough for your own tastes. Did slave labor in the
antebellum United States undermine the legitimacy of the price of cotton shirts?
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whether it is immediately visible or not, especially if they take seriously
the idea of the social bases of self-respect.
C. Recursive Collective Action Problems
The second challenge to the "naturalist" account of prices just dis-
cussed, along with some aspects of the first such challenge, can be
viewed as being in a certain sense analytically exogenous to that account
even if practically unavoidable. There is, in other words, at least some-
thing by way of a "there there" to which proponents might be appealing
or for which they might be groping, even if some proponents occasion-
ally manifest a surprising ignorance of or indifference to the extra-sys-
temic prerequisites to the price systems that they idealize. The third
challenge we wish to highlight, by contrast, is thoroughly endogenous to
the idealized account itself; it undercuts the very idea of a price system
as a sort of watch that can tick on indefinitely once the public watch-
maker has built it, wound it, and set it in motion.
The price system as we know it is commonly distorted by a vast
array of recursive collective action problems.4 9 These are situations in
which individually rational actions aggregate into collectively irrational
outcomes (the collective action problem simpliciter, itself a canonical
"market failure"), as calamitously worsened by agent-interactive, itera-
tive, and accordingly self-exacerbating structures. 50 The bank run and the
asset price "fire sale" are particularly salient examples in the wake of the
world's recent financial dramas, but financial markets and macroecono-
mies more generally are pervasively susceptible to such market-destroy-
ing dynamics. Positional goods arms races, asset price bubbles and busts,
consumer price hyperinflations and debt-deflations are all poignant cases
in point.5 1
One of the more curious, if not indeed ironic, aspects of the phe-
nomenon of recursive collective action problems is its particular grip on
what is often portrayed as the very citadel of rational pricing: financial
assets. Efficient markets hypotheses of various stripes suggest that finan-
cial markets impound all relevant information in prices at any given time.
That might be so if we read the qualifier "available" into the phrase "rel-
49 This class of problems is introduced and discussed in Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper
for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010); see also Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0:
A Constructive Retrieval, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2013). For systematic explication,
by reference to a large class of examples, see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action
Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, Macroecono-
mies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSPECTIVES 1 (2015).
50 See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 49, at 8-11.
51 Id.
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evant information. '52 But because financial assets often are traded to be
traded-that is, speculatively bought to be sold-there is no natural
brake on their price dynamic. That is particularly so when trades are
financed by indefinitely extensible endogenous credit, the limits of ex-
tensibility being apparently unknowable and accordingly uncapturable by
asset prices even in informationally efficient markets. 53 Some find this
vulnerability nothing short of paradoxical: the markets that come closest
to "efficiency" in the sense that trades are nothing but trades, without
friction or natural stickiness, are precisely those markets where self-rein-
forcing destructive dynamics are most prevalent, and most dangerous.
54
Curious paradoxes aside, the fact is that the price system is open to
severe distortions that allow for no or multiple equilibria and are not self-
correcting. 55 Monetary authorities and other policymakers are in varying
degrees aware of this vulnerability and take it seriously, sometimes put-
ting in place structures to avoid or to mitigate its most undesirable ef-
fects-particularly when they concern what one of us has elsewhere
called "systemically important prices."'56 Those mechanisms are critical
parts-indeed often existentially critical parts-of a collective engage-
ment that makes prices. And when those mechanisms are not in place,
the dynamics themselves affect prices-often, again, catastrophically.
The bottom line is that the price system's ability to generate coordination
is limited when faced with such endogenously generated dynamics; and
when those dynamics are corrected, it is the collective work of institu-
tion-making that generates prices.
III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PRICE DETERMINATION
The justifications for the price system as the backbone of a just mar-
ket order embrace generality on two fronts. In principle, such arguments
espouse market ordering as the most generally applicable and desirable
mode of distribution; in other words, they favor using the market for the
widest array of provision possible.57 As a matter of rhetoric, as we sug-
52 See, e.g., Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 49. On this point; see also
Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame 37 CORNELL L. F. 14 (2011).
53 See Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, supra note 49, at 18; see also Hockett,
Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 49 at 18.
54 For additional accounts of such dynamics focused more on liquidity than credit, see
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY,
147-64 (1936); and, more recently, MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM 85-101 (2016).
For a early accounts stressing margin-buying and credit, see IRVING FISHER, BOOMS AND DE-
PRESSIONS (1932); Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1
ECONOMETRICA 337, 344-46 (1933).
55 See sources cited supra note 49.
56 Robert Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, 2 J. FIN. REG. 1,
1 (2016).
57 See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 20, at 13; TOMASI, supra note 29, at 242-47.
JUST PRICES
gested above, such arguments paint a picture of actual markets as ap-
proximating ideal or competitive markets. The desirable features of the
markets they favor include competition (meaning both the absence of
monopoly and monopsony and the absence of other sources of market
power) and crucially, the fact that prices are not determined by anyone in
particular. Everyone recognizes that actual markets do not achieve per-
fect competition, but the departures from the ideal are presented as minor
and anomalous, at least for purposes of evaluating the price system.58
From our perspective both faces of generality are problematic. As our
view of markets becomes more realistic, attentive both to indispensable
background conditions and endogenous market-structural characteristics,
we see that their heterogeneity is actually a dominant feature.
When we take the heterogeneity of market pricing into account, a
set of important insights emerges. First, the price system works differ-
ently in different contexts. At some times in some places, it is indeed a
decentralized coordination mechanism of the type that Hayek famously
described.59 But for the most part, that coordination relies quite heavily
on centralized decisions that come in many forms: benchmarking, market
making, market moving, market levering, and backstopping, among
others.60 The conventional frame depicts complete decentralization as the
norm, with "intervention" as an anomaly or potential "distortion" to be
justified, such that any "tampering" with prices should be avoided except
where absolutely necessary. But this picture gets things sideways if not
backwards. It misconstrues actual markets badly, and it posits as a gen-
eral ideal a norm that ought to be applied only where it actually serves its
goals. In other words, it relies on a grossly distorted descriptive account
to generate a poor normative orientation.
The first step toward a better understanding of the price system is
the recognition that many prices, including many of the most important
58 We call this a matter of rhetoric because analytically, most arguments for market or-
dering are open to many readings. If one were to highlight the known departures from the ideal
model, many of these arguments can themselves be turned into the basis of critique of actually
existing market societies. But the rhetoric, at least in the most important cases, is certainly not
accidental. For an elaboration of the argument that "the advantages of competition do not
depend on it being perfect," see 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLM-
CAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 65-67 (1982).
59 Hayek, supra note 18. For an elaboration that emphasizes the important distinction
between coordination and incentives, see John E. Roemer, Prospects for Achieving Equality in
Market Economies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 693, 697-99 (Brian
Nolan et al. eds., 2009).
60 Some of this taxonomy is developed in Hockett & Omarova, supra note 33; and elabo-
rated further in both Hockett & Omarova, supra note 56 and Robert C. Hockett & Saule T.
Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93
WASH. U. L. REv. 103 (2015).
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prices from a systemic perspective,61 are engineered-directly or indi-
rectly-by public institutions. This is perhaps most decisively and most
obviously true for interest rates (i.e., the rental price of money, or credit),
which are determined and managed by central banks. But those who find
the dynamics of interest rates esoteric or obscure should not be fooled
into thinking that interest rates are the only important prices engineered
by or through public institutions. Interest rates happen to be an area
where governments affect both the background conditions (in taxing and
spending decisions) and the foreground conditions (by determining short
term interest rates such as the Fed Funds Rate through open market oper-
ations). Crucially, however, entire sectors of the economy including edu-
cation, energy, and health care are dominated by prices with heavy
engineering aspects, as are markets in some of the most important com-
modities. Sometimes the results are perverse; 62 sometimes, markedly
beneficial. 63 The important starting point for serious discussion is that we
already generate a vast array of prices through complex interactions of
public and private action; spontaneously arising prices with little central
coordination do not present a general case-they are far more apt to be
the exception than the rule.
The next step is to acknowledge that the engineered character of
prices refutes the idea that there is no planning. At least where prices are
engineered, we require a better vocabulary to consider and evaluate the
engineering that occurs, as well as the social relations that it assumes and
advances. The supposed abdication of responsibility for pricing is bad
enough as a missed opportunity; it is even worse when it masks sub-rosa
decisions with regressive implications-and worse still when the ar-
rangements are not simply distributively regressive, but positively
destructive.
One additional step would be a classification that points in a norma-
tive direction; some aspects of pricing should be pushed toward the ideal
forms of market coordination. That is, many of the arenas where prices
can be structured such that they approximate something like "democrati-
61 For an account of which prices are systemically significant, how prices or indexes take
on such status, and what sorts of policy response their significance underwrites, see Hockett &
Omarova, Systemically Significant Prices, supra note 56.
62 Consider the interlocking price engineering of sweetener: sugar farmers enjoy a tariff,
so the price of sugar is high; corn farmers enjoy a subsidy, so the price of corn syrup is low.
The prices lead producers, say of soft drinks, to prefer corn syrup, and health effects of pro-
ducing with corn syrup rather than sugar are apparently disastrous. LAWRENCE LEssIG, REPUB-
LiC LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESs-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 44-52 (2012).
63 Consider the first five decades (at least) of government support for a secondary market
in mortgages, which buoyed the construction industry and increased home-ownership by half.
See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 19, at 113-14.
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cally regulated endowment-neutral" 64 market mechanisms are arenas that
would be desirable sites of coordination. But even that ideal is not com-
plete. There are cases in which the social relations arising from a transac-
tional world simply do not advance, and can even impede, the ultimate
goals of the ideal.
This claim needs unpacking. First, one has to recall that the market
ideal, even in its endowment neutral egalitarian form, is not an ultimate
end. It is instead an instrumentality whose goal is to assist in instantiating
a social structure in which people have the best chance to develop them-
selves. By linking economic freedom to individual choice and self-devel-
opment, the market ideal attaches itself to a vision of personal
autonomy-this is its key strength. But it is the autonomy or self-govern-
ment that we are after, not the market for its own sake. So, where market
transactional pricing does not advance (or even undermines) self-govern-
ment, we have to look for other mechanisms of linking people in cooper-
ative relationships. One of the problems with the current ideal (or
translation) is its individualism, which has inherent difficulty in tracking
the goods that no single individual imagines as a singular opportunity for
advancement, but which are clearly benefits to large numbers of groups
and individuals.
Some of these areas are places where disaggregated preference ex-
pression through prices simply cannot account for socially important
goods-public goods are the obvious, but far from the only example.
Some are places where the underlying good is part of the social bases of
self-respect (thus, probably, health care). Other areas where planning is
necessary seem ripe for this type of work. The challenge is not to allow
these areas of planning to become brakes on innovation, which we often
associate with the unplanned spontaneity and even the chaos of markets.
With these general considerations in mind, we move onto some examples
of areas where a more active orientation toward collectively setting or
influencing prices will allow the price system to advance plausible con-
ceptions of justice.
IV. JUST PRICING IN ACTION
The price system is less of a spontaneous "marvel" 65 or a force of
nature than many of its advocates would have us believe. From our per-
spective, the upshot of the preceding analysis is double: first, we should
be more mindful of the fact that in practice much of the price system is
engineered, and thus we should be watchful that existing practices of
64 Hockett & Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public" Ends, supra note 33, at 57; see
generally Hockett sources cited, supra note 19.
65 The phrase is Hayek's, and he notes its deliberate use to "shock the reader." Hayek,
supra notel8, at 527.
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price engineering are geared toward justifiable goals. Second, the fact
that the price system is always a mix of public and private action should
give us more confidence in designing normatively attractive modes of
pricing. In short, we should be much less squeamish than is typical in
pursuing just pricing. The analysis of existing departures of pricing from
successful spontaneous order, along with the general considerations out-
lined above, offer potential guidance for developing examples of what
just pricing might look like in action. In what follows, we first mention a
number of discrete potential paths for generating examples and then
sketch one integrative example.
One avenue toward developing examples is to target areas where the
noted weaknesses of the model of spontaneous pricing (existing collec-
tive pricing; background inequality; and recursive collective action
problems) are particularly egregious and salient.
Regarding existing collective decisions on pricing, consider the
prices of pharmaceuticals as currently governed by the patent system.
The patent system allows firms that develop popular drugs to enjoy mo-
nopoly pricing, pricing many potential users out of the market. A prize
system, on the other hand, reduces prices (to close to cost) and radically
increases access to medicine, but retains the advantages of competition
regarding potential lines of research and innovation. 66 This is simply the
choice of one system of coordination over another; a prize system repre-
sents no more intervention than a patent system. But its effect on prices
is completely different, and holds the promise of mitigating or eliminat-
ing several of the most insidious features of the patent system.
67
On the issue of background inequality, it is clear that conditions of
extreme poverty are breeding grounds for transactions that can impinge
on the social bases of self-respect. It is similarly clear that the correlation
between extreme poverty and unemployment or underemployment is
high. Currently, welfare support, such as it is, in combination with the
minimum wage, serves as something of a floor on these conditions. A
universal basic income or "negative income tax," noted above, might op-
erate similarly. A more ambitious remedy, also noted above, would be a
public "employer of last resort" function of the kind first proposed by
66 For a detailed analysis, see generally WILLIAM W. FISHER Ill AND TALHA SYED, IN-
FECTION: THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT
IT (forthcoming 2017); William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, A Prize System as a Partial Solution
to the Health Crisis in the Developing World, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH: PAT-
ENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 181, 181-208 (Thomas Pogge ed., 2010).
67 The example is meant to be illustrative, not conclusive regarding pharmaceuticals. The
point is simply that there are areas where we use background rules as massive, fairly blunt
tools that generate prices - and that they are not necessarily the best tools. Where others are
available, the basic sensitivity to the fact that existing prices are engineered should be liberat-
ing when considering alternatives.
JUST PRICES
Minsky, subsequently advocated by Minsky's student Wray, and now
advocated by a growing chorus of advocates. 68 Under such a program,
the government offers to employ anyone willing and able to work, effec-
tively eliminating unemployment. Just as important from our perspective,
the wage offered by the employer of last resort would functionally
benchmark wages - something that is not true of a minimum wage when
unemployment still exists. 69 The program would not be costless (though
savings on current public assistance programs and additional tax reve-
nues generated by employment-induced macroeconomic growth might
well outrun costs within a short time, especially once the economy is
healthy). But the important point is that in a relatively simple manner, we
could, acting collectively through our public instrumentalities, effec-
tively set a wage that would obviate the most routine aspects of degrad-
ing life conditions by moving the price of marginal labor.
On the issue of recursive collective action problems, little need be
said to those familiar with our still-recent financial market troubles. De-
posit insurance for commercial banks, combined with regulatory condi-
tionality and the Fed's lender of last resort function, essentially ended the
problem of runs on banks in the 1930s following the 1929 crash. During
our more recent financial crisis, governments and central banks stepped
in as "dealers of last resort" to put a floor on the prices of financial assets
being run-on in "fire sales," again accompanying the "bailouts" with
later-imposed regulatory conditions. A broader "market-maker of last re-
sort" function could expand both the types of assets eligible and the types
of financial or non-financial actors with access to such price determina-
tion-provided, again, that regulatory strings were attached to head-off
abuse of the safety net.70
Finally, consider the following integrative example. Throughout the
advanced economies, the last forty years have witnessed a major trans-
formation in the mode of savings for retirement. Defined benefit plans
are mostly a historical relic; defined contribution plans once seemed to
leave a fair amount of decision-making power with the workers affected
by the plans (or their unions). Over the last forty years, however, the
remnants of such solidarity in investing have dissipated, as fund manag-
ers increasingly work precisely according to financial industry standards
68 See sources cited supra note 44 see genereally also HYMAN P. MINSKY, ENDING Pov-
ERTY: JOBS, NOT WELFARE (2013); Pavlina R. Tchemeva, Beyond Full Employment: The Em-
ployer of Last Resort as an Institution for Change, Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 732
(2012), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_732.pdf.
69 WRAY, supra note 44, at 128 ("[M]inimum wage laws are effective only at full
employment").
70 See Hockett, A Fixer-Upper, supra note 49, at 27-32.
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with the sole goal of maximizing the returns of the fund.71 Pension sav-
ings have become more individualized, and the institutional investors
who manage them are the epitome of the search for yields. Some aca-
demics might be surprised to learn that even the once hallowed "non-
profit" investment company TIAA is now affected by this trend, portend-
ing ominous changes to come.72 Over the course of nearly half a century,
money that was initially held in safe assets (like government bonds, or
corporate bonds of the largest companies) has shifted drastically into eq-
uities, fueling a huge rise in the market capitalization of US stock mar-
kets. This has, in effect, been a system of price supports for the capital
markets.
Such a system raises a host of questions. It is far from clear that
workers whose pension savings are funneled into the markets will be
better off in terms of returns at the time of their retirement. At the very
least, such workers have become subject to much greater volatility as
their pension savings become more and more speculative. But even if we
assume that the bottom line at the moment of retirement is a net gain
(again, not a sure bet by any stretch of the imagination, as retirees during
2008-09 will attest), the overall effects of such a major shift are dubious
as far as workers are concerned. 73 The current situation focuses the in-
vestment strategy of the funds on a single goal, which is maximizing
profits. It ignores two aspects of long-term savings that could be crucial
for the savers: first, the importance of stability; and second, the potential
impact of the investment in real time.
For illustrative purposes, imagine being given the following choice:
1. invest in an index of foreign stocks, with your average return being
100 - however with equal chances of it being 75 or 125; 2. invest in a
community development project in your own community with an aver-
age return of 95 with low volatility (say equal chances of 98 or 92). Now
factor in the fact that the work in your own community also promises
positive externalities in the community. Perhaps some of those positive
externalities can even be monetized. With these numbers, this is obvi-
ously an easy case, and not just for the risk-averse.
71 See generally MICHAEL A. McCARTHY, DISMANTLING SOLIDARrY: CAPrrALIST POLIT-
ICS AND AMERICAN PENSIONS SINCE THE NEW DEAL (2017) (arguing that pensions have be-
come increasingly tied to risky markets because of capitalist policymaking).
72 See Gretchen Morgenson, The Finger-Pointing at the Finance Firm TIAA, N. Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/business/the-finger-pointing-at-
the-finance-firm-tiaa.html?smid=fb-share.
73 The most startling problems arise when a retirement fund makes a strategic investment
that directly harms members of the fund, for instance by making possible the outsourcing of
their jobs. David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor's Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2106,
2116-19 (2014).
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Setting up the latter possibility requires some serious financial engi-
neering. But it doesn't actually require any more "intervention" into the
financial system than the current skew toward long term investment in
the capital markets. In order for such projects to be viable, it is likely that
the government would have to set up something like a national invest-
ment authority (or several such local authorities). Such an authority
would engage in "a wide range of financial market activities explicitly
aimed at the provision of broadly-defined-and currently under-sup-
plied-public goods."' 74 The authority would run competitive bids for
socially beneficial projects. And given the current state of infrastructure
in the US, picking winners is a matter of reaching for low hanging fruit.
The details of such a mechanism are far beyond the scope of our
inquiry here.75 The important thing to note is the relatively long chain of
important prices that would be directly affected by such a mechanism. A
large set of well-paid (many would say overpaid) middle-men who man-
age the investments of large scale institutions, the managers in Minsky's
money manager capitalism, 76 would be constricted. The fees that savers
pay those managers would for the most part disappear. But most impor-
tantly, the costs of socially beneficial projects whose profit stream is ei-
ther too long-term or too insecure would be drastically cut. Many
projects that simply cannot be funded right now would have secure
sources of income. The potential positive spillovers of such a project are
staggering.
This is not the place to develop a full policy proposal, but the exam-
ple is telling; it suggests that pricing as we generally conduct it often
leaves important societal benefits off the table. When we approach the
issue of pricing as an engineering challenge that is endemic to our law
and politics, we can reassume responsibility for making society a better
place. And that is what thinking about justice and prices should con-
stantly remind us of.
CONCLUSION
We've covered a fair bit of ground here-we hope not too much. In
considering the "ethical challenges of the market" as was our brief at the
conference for which we prepared this Article, it seems natural to devote
some attention to that most central and salient of market upshots, market
74 Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for
a National Investment Authority, 43 J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 33) (https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2939309).
75 For many of the details on the investment side, see id. On the funding side, the model
here is more straightforward, as it taps into pension savings directly, without waiting for deci-
sions by current institutional investors.
76 See L. Randall Wray, Minsky's Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial
Crisis, 40 INT'L J. POL. ECON. 5, 9, 12 (2011).
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prices. We have attempted to make a case for the proposition that, just as
the distributions of benefits and burdens worked by markets are fit sub-
jects of justice inquiry, so are those distributions' most immediate reflec-
tions and determinants-market prices. Insofar as we have succeeded in
making the case, it will be clear that market prices can reflect and perpet-
uate varyingly just and unjust spreads of good and ill over the popula-
tions that make use of markets as modes of allocation and distribution.
There can in this sense be varying just and unjust prices. To say this need
not entangle one in revived medieval disputation over "just price theory,"
whatever the range of adjacency between those disputations and our re-
flections. It simply calls attention to what ought to have been obvious all
along-that prices, as what Marx memorably characterized as projec-
tions of social relations, will tend to be no more and no less just than
those relations themselves. That means our efforts to improve the latter
will proceed in tandem with our efforts to improve the former.
